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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
An ethical advancement of scientific knowledge demands a delicate 
equilibrium between benefits and harms, in particular in health-related research. 
When applying and advancing scientific knowledge or technologies, Article 4 of 
UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, ethically 
justifiable research requires maximizing direct and indirect benefits, and minimizing 
possible harms.1 The National Institution of Health [NIH] Data Sharing Policy and 
Implementation Guidance similarly states that data necessary for drawing valid 
conclusions and advancing medical research, should be made as widely and freely 
available as possible (in order to share the benefits), while safeguarding the privacy 
of participants from potentially harmful disclosure of sensitive information.2 This 
paper discusses the challenges in the maximization of research benefit and the 
minimization of potential harms in the unique context of health-related research in 
Big Data from multiple sources, which are differently protected by the law.  
Part I frames the ethical dilemma by discussing potential benefits and 
harms, showing the constant misalignment in health-related research in Big Data 
from multiple sources, between the benefits in the use of confidential information for 
scientific purposes, and the value in keeping confidentiality. In part II, the paper 
addresses existing regulations, their nature and legal coverage. It highlights the 
challenges prevailing when combining data from multiple sources that are differently 
protected by the law. Part III compares different requirements for consent or 
                                                          
 1 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005). 
 2 NIH, NIH Data Sharing Policy and Implementation Guidance (2003), 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/data_sharing_guidance.htm  
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authorization to use persons’ health information for research. It focuses on the 
difficulty of existing regulation to ensure those requirements when using multiple 
sources of data. Part IV investigates whether exemptions from the authorization 
requirement could prevail in the context of information that exceeds the protection of 
the HIPAA and the Protection of Human Subjects Regulations. In part V the paper 
proposes a solution is of a statistical nature, using the method of synthetic data to 
balance conflicting consideration. Part VI shows how the use of synthetic data can 
overcome some of the ethical challenges. 
II. A DELICATE EQUILIBRIUM 
 
The term “Big Data” is differently defined by users and policy makers. 
What it means is dramatically different to the media, business, health, or academic 
statistics communities, and to different regulatory bodies.3 To our knowledge, there 
is no gold standard definition. Big Data is considered data on a massive scale in 
terms of volume, intensity, and complexity that exceed the ability of standard 
software tools to manage and analyze.4 But also, “It is less about data that is big than 
it is about a capacity to search, aggregate, and cross-reference large data sets.”5 
Laney coined the definition in the Big Data analytics world: volume (amount of 
                                                          
 3 Jordan JM & Lin DK, Statistics for Big Data: Are Statisticians Ready for Big Data? 
INT’L CHINESE STAT. ASS’N BULL (2014) 52: 133; Vlasses F et al., Leveraging Technology for 
Research, in NURSING INFORMATICS  (‏2009), 692. 
 4 See, e.g., Snijders C et al., "Big Data": Big Gaps of Knowledge in the Field of Internet 
Science, INT'L J. INTERNET SCI. (2012), 7: 1. 
 5 Boyd D & Crawford K, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, 
Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y (2012), 15: 662, 663. 
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data), velocity (speed of data in and out), and variety (range of data types and 
sources) – the 3V definition.6  
 As life is being recorded and quantified in ways hard to imagine a decade 
ago,‏ there is great promise in Big Data research, in particular for health purposes. 
The literature often addresses medical records as the source for health-related 
research in Big Data,7 for example, electronic records document multiple aspects of 
medical care: quantitative and qualitative data of patients, imaging records, 
providers’ documentation of health care delivery (medication and other services), 
narratives and genetic information, all of which provide important information on a 
person's physical condition.8 But as many details of our lives are documented and 
easily available for analysis, a variety of nontraditional or even unstructured data 
types contains different kinds of health-related information, which is combined with 
traditional medical databases. Medical or genetic data can be connected to data 
found on multiple sources: social media, surveillance videos, education, military 
service, exercise regimens, credit card payments for physician visit co-pays, visits to 
alternative practitioners, over the counter medications, home testing products, 
tobacco products, diet habits, or leisure time preferences.9 Since a single database 
may not provide a complete picture of a patient’s condition or health history, 
combining information from multiple sources is often necessary and allows ways of 
                                                          
 6 Laney D., 3D Data Management: Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and 
Variety, META GROUP RESEARCH NOTE 6 (2001), 70. 
 7 See, e.g., SHARONA HOFFMAN, ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS AND MEDICAL BIG DATA: 
LAW AND POLICY Vol. 32 (Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
 8 See, e.g., Fan J. et al., Challenges of Big Data Analysis, NATIONAL SCI. REV. (2014), 1: 
293, 295. 
 9 Tasha Glenn & Scott Monteith, Privacy in the Digital World: Medical and Health Data 
Outside of HIPAA Protections, 16 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REPORTS 494(2) (2014). 
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research previously not possible through traditional methods performed on a narrow 
spectrum of samples.10 
On the one hand, health-related research combining multiple sources of Big 
Data offers the potential to explore hidden structures of the data, and extract 
important common features across data sets, in order to derive accurate results 
regarding complex questions in real-time.11 Research can find correlation between 
multiple contextual variables found in public databases without having to interview a 
single patient.   It contributes to a better understanding of people’s life-style by 
creating an observational and even dynamic analysis, even when there are significant 
individual variations.12 Such research can open the door for the promising world of 
personalized medicine and bring each individual customized treatments based on 
evidence drawn from their own lives. It can lead to the improvement of efficiency of 
health care delivery and public health decisions through standardized care and 
advance medicine, while saving costs nationally and globally.  
On the other hand, there is a constant conflict between the benefit of using 
multiple sources of information and the value of preserving confidentiality of 
medical information. The need to maintain patients’ privacy is an ethical obligation 
inherent in the physician-patient relationship, believed to be essential in order to 
generate better medicine – from diagnosis to treatment. The rationale underlying the 
doctrine of confidentiality of medical information is to enable patients to benefit 
                                                          
 10  Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Enhancing Privacy, Improving Health Through 
Research, 177 (Lawrence O. Gostin, Laura A. Levit & Sharyl J. Nass, eds., 2009) (hereinafter 
Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule).  
 11 Fan et al., supra note 8, at 294. 
 12 Murdoch TB & Detsky AS, The Inevitable Application of Big Data to Health Care, 309 
JAMA 1351, 1351 (2013). 
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from free and open communication regarding their status. Since information is 
essential to treatment, it is of no wonder that health service providers have access to 
all or portions of a patient's health records, however health care providers have a 
duty to avoid disclosure of medical information they obtain. In legal terms, the 
patient has a right of privacy, which aims to restrict the disclosure of confidential 
information.13 
While the classical physician-patient model requires that information will 
be kept confidential, the more health information is present in electronic databases, 
the harder it is to maintain the privacy of individuals who are the subject of such 
information, and the greater is the potential misuse of information. Evidence of 
confidentiality breaches exist in State agencies in the US, healthcare organizations,14 
as well as in private organizations.15  
Free communication is altered when patients fear that their sensitive health 
information might be electronically disclosed. Such fear may compromise the health 
                                                          
 13 For individual rights, see Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note ‏10, at 160. 
 14 E.g., Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(6) (reviewing a survey of 91 healthcare 
organizations, where 90 % reported at least one incident in the last two years while 38 % 
reported more than five incidents. When including only breaches involving at least 500 
individuals, over 29 million patient health records have been compromised since 2009.); 
Goldman J, 91 Percent of Healthcare Organizations Suffered Data Breaches in the Past Two 
Years, ESECURITY PLANET (May 12, 2015), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-
security/91-percent-of-healthcare-organizations-suffered-data-breaches-in-the-past-two-
years.html (The Ponemon Institute found that 91% of healthcare organizations have suffered 
at least one data breach since 2013, and 40% have suffered more than five); Hacker 
Reportedly Selling Personal and Medical Data of 655,000 Patients, INSURANCE FRAUD NEWS 
(June 27, 2016), http://www.insurancefraud.org/IFNS-detail.htm?key=22997 (In June 2016, a 
hacker was reported to sell copies of databases stolen from three unidentified U.S. healthcare 
organizations and one unnamed health insurer, containing data on nearly 10 million 
individuals on the dark web or prices ranging from about $96,000 to $490,000 in bitcoin for 
each database). 
 15 Goldman J, Data Breach at UCLA Health Exposes 4.5 Million People's Personal 
Information, ESECURITY PLANET, (July 21, 2015), http://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-
security/data-breach-at-ucla-health-exposes-4.5-million-peoples-personal-information.html 
(According to the Department of Health and Human Services, more than 120 million people 
have been compromised in more than 1,110 breaches since 2009 – a third of the U.S. 
population.)  
  93 
 BASSAN, THE ETHICS IN SYNTHETICS 
 
 
care they seek. As studies show, for fear of disclosure to unauthorized persons, 
patients may withhold information, giving an incomplete or misleading description 
of their condition.16 In recent surveys, a substantial number of people said they 
would withhold data from their physician due to privacy concerns related to 
technology.17 Patients concerned with privacy violations are also less likely to seek 
care or return for follow-up treatment. They may seek care outside of their provider 
network, compromising the benefits of care coordination.18 
 Achieving ideal privacy or attempting to eliminate all possible breaches of 
confidentiality prevents society from the benefits inherent in research. However, 
researchers are often unaware of potential harms, especially given the large presence 
of health information in different sources of databases, some of which is voluntarily 
provided by users.19 The next chapter reviews existing regulations, their nature and 
legal coverage. It highlights the challenges prevailing when combining data from 
multiple sources that are differently protected by the law.  
III. DIFFERENT SCOPES OF PROTECTIVE REGULATIONS  
 
 In the case of health-related research in Big Data, policies and regulations 
should assure two dimensions of ethics: on the one hand, focused on harms, the 
                                                          
 16 Sankar P et al., Patient Perspectives of Medical Confidentiality: A Review of the 
Literature, 18 J GEN INTERN MED. 659 (2003). 
 17 Agaku IT et al., Concern about Security and Privacy, and Perceived Control Over 
Collection and Use of Health Information are Related to withholding of Health Information 
from Healthcare Providers, 21 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASSOC. 374 (2014) (over 10% of 
patients tend to withhold relevant medical information from their physicians). 
 18 Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(7) tb. 3; Scott C, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for 
Your Health--An Introduction to the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 
GA. ST. UL REV. 481, 529 (2000). 
 19 Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(2) (e.g.,one-third of U.S. consumers use 
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter for medical related discussions such as to check consumer 
reviews). 
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protection of information itself and of subjects whose information is used. On the 
other, focused on benefit, that the benefit from the research overweighs potential 
harms. The first dimension relates to confidentiality of personal information held in 
databases, whether or not they are health-related, Big Data, publicly available, or 
not. The second dimension addresses the equilibrium between privacy concerns and 
benefits from the research. Research in health-related data from multiple sources 
jeopardizes both aspects.   
 The legal frameworks addressing the release of data for health-related 
research purposes differ in levels of protection in terms such as the scope of the 
information covered and permitted disclosures: identified and de-identified 
information, held by entities covered or non-covered by laws, different uses of 
information, etc. This paper focuses on the HHS Protection of Human Subjects 
Regulations, and the Privacy Rule of Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which represent the regulative framework of health-
related research on the one hand, and of the operation of personal health information, 
on the other.20 
 The Protection of Human Subjects Regulations are the leading guidelines in 
ethical and regulatory issues in biomedical and behavioral research. According to 
definitions in the regulations, research on a human being is a systematic 
investigation, and research on a living individual about whom an investigator 
conducting research obtains identifiable private information constitutes research in a 
human being.21 Typically, this regulation have not been applied to the core 
                                                          
 20 Protection of Human Subjects Regulations, 45 C.F.R. §46 (2007); The Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), P.L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1938 
(1996). 
 21 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d), (f). 
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disciplines of Big Data (computing, mathematics, and statistics) because in health-
related Big Data research, researchers frequently do not interact with the individual 
subjects of their research. Big Data disciplines are assumed to be conducting 
research on systems, not people.22 However, we chose to use them as reference due 
to their health research orientation and concern for research subjects whose personal 
health information is being used for research. These, we believe, should be guiding 
rationales in health related research in Big Data as well.  
HIPAA’s main goal is to assure that identified personal health information 
of people who seek care is properly protected under national standards, while 
allowing the flow of health information needed to provide and promote high quality 
health care and public health.23 The HIPAA strikes a balance between the benefit in 
the use of information and safeguarding the privacy of individuals. Similarly to the 
Protection of Human Subjects Regulations, HIPAA broadly defines research as any 
“systematic investigation, including research development, testing, and evaluation, 
designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge”.24 While the HIPAA 
is inclusive of Big Data research in terms of the type of research, it is exclusive in 
terms of types of information covered, and nature of coverage. 
 HIPAA’s scope is limited to covered entities (a health plan, a health care 
clearinghouse, or a health care provider who transmits any Protected Health 
Information (PHI) in electronic form25) in relation to treatment or healthcare 
                                                          
 22 Metcalf J, Big Data Analytics and Revision of the Common Rule, 59 COMMUNICATIONS 
OF THE ACM, 31 (2016). 
 23 Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.gov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/laws-regulations/index.html (last visited Dec. 7, 2017).  
 24 45CFR § 164.501 (2007). 
25See 45 C.F.R. §160.103(4) (2007). 
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operation. Medical information held by third parties is not protected under the 
HIPAA.26 Researchers are not themselves covered entities, unless they are also 
health care providers and engage in any of the covered electronic transactions. 
However, researchers who are not themselves covered entities, or who are not 
workforce members of covered entities, may be indirectly affected by the Privacy 
Rule if covered entities supply their data.27 Also, any information or analytics 
derived from sources not subjected to HIPAA, although may be equally sensitive, is 
not legally protected under HIPPA safeguards.28 
 Health information used in research which combines multiple data bases 
may differ in the regulation it is subjected to, since different sources of personal 
information are differently regulated. Some may be subjected to more than one 
legislation, thus protected, while others subjected to none. However, both types of 
regulation specifically excludes two types of research, involving the collection of 
publicly available sources of data, e.g. information in social media, as well as de-
identified information, i.e. information that was recorded by the investigator in such 
a manner that an individual subject could not be identified either directly or through 
identifiers linked to the subject.29 Neither information people voluntarily share on 
                                                          
26For example, 23andMe, a direct-to-consumer genetic testing enterprise, holds more than a 
million people’s genetic data, and there sample bank is constantly expanding.  Social media 
and other commercial companies also have large Databases. 
27Health Services Research and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, NIH, 10, (May 20, 2005), 
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/healthservicesprivacy.asp. Cf. HIPAA requires that any 
entity which is subjected to the law will obtain satisfactory contractual assurances from its 
business associates, stating that they will appropriately safeguard the PHI they receive or 
create on behalf of the covered entity according the requirements specified under the Privacy 
Rule. 45 C.F.R. § 160.300 (2007). 
 28 Coy K & Hoffman NW, Big Data Analytics Under HIPAA, LEGAL INSIGHT (2016) 
http://www.agg.com/files/Publication/52c146ff-493e-41a9-84f9-
a014e091ebfb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/76dc5af9-fd45-4533-98ac-
5beed1010278/Coy-Hoffman-Big-Data-Analytics-under-HIPAA.pdf. 
 29 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (2007); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (a) (2007). 
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social media, nor information that does not identify an individual is considered 
Protected Health Information. Traditionally, where the data is “publicly available,” 
the research is not subject to IRB approval. Taking into consideration the amount of 
data voluntarily put in the public and commercial sphere, neither the purpose of use, 
nor the lack of explicit consent fall under the regulative data protections. The risk of 
identification that has been determined for one particular data set in the context of a 
HIPAA environment may not be appropriate for the same data set in a multiple 
source environment which exceeds the scope of the HIPAA.  
IV. AN AUTHORIZATION TO USE INFORMATION FOR HEALTH-RELATED 
RESEARCH 
 According to the Protection of Human Subjects Regulations (“Common 
Rule”), in any government-funded research held in the U.S. individuals must express 
their voluntarily autonomous decision that their information will be used, by giving 
an informed consent based on adequate information and comprehension.30 Adequate 
information should relate, among other things, to the purposes of the research, the 
expected duration of the subject's participation (in Big Data research it could address 
the expected duration of the use of the information), foreseeable risks, the extent, to 
which confidentiality of records identifying the subject will be maintained, the 
expected benefits to the subject or to others.31 Obviously, the requirement for 
informed consent used in research done on human subjects is different from the 
authorization to use personal data in HIPAA.32 The Common Rule is concerned 
primarily with the physical risks to humans associated with participation in a 
                                                          
 30 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2007).  
 31 Id.   
 32 See Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note ‏10, at 164 (On informed consent vs. 
patient authorization); Scott, supra note 18, at 521. 
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research study, rather than with the protection of privacy of information, which is the 
focus of the HIPAA.33 The HIPAA is concerned with the use of information. While 
no prior authorization is required from the individual before information about him 
is used or disclosed, any use of PHI requires an authorization (not informed 
consent), which is a signed permission to allow a covered entity to use or disclose 
the individual's information.34  Individuals should be informed in advance how their 
information will be used or disclosed, therefore the authorization must contain at 
least one of the following elements: a description of the information to be used or 
disclosed, identification of persons authorized to make the requested use or 
disclosure; identification of the person(s) to whom the covered entity may make the 
disclosure; a description of each purpose of the disclosure.35 They should have the 
opportunity to agree to, prohibit, or restrict the use or disclosure.36  
 According to both the Common Rule, a subject may discontinue to 
participate in a research at any time.37 However, individuals have the right to revoke 
authorization only to the extent a covered entity has not taken action in reliance on 
that authorization.38 While such revocation may affect a clinical trial and would 
compromise its future, in Big Data research, the option to revoke authorization for 
use and disclosure of PHI is therefore practical only before the data has been used. 
The covered entity can continue using and disclosing information obtained prior to 
                                                          
 33 Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note ‏10, at 186. 
 34 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (a)(1) (2007).  
 35 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1) (2007). 
 36 45 C.F.R. § 164.510 (2007). 
 37 45 CFR 46.116(a)(8). 164.508(c)(2) (2007).  
 38 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(5)(i), (ii) (2007). Cf. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) art. 7(3). 
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the revocation for future research.39 This is especially alarming given that the 
authorization does not have to state an expiration date or event, or limit the 
permission to use certain sensitive information.40  
 In particular when combined with information voluntarily provided by 
users, the authorization to use personal information for Big Data research 
compromises all three elements at the basis of a person’s decision to allow the use of 
his or her information: information, comprehension and voluntariness. First, in most 
cases, authorization to use the data from public or commercial data bases for 
research is obtained when users are requested to accept a “Data Use Policy” or 
“Privacy Policy” of a website, an app, or a program in which they share their 
information, as a necessary condition to use the service. Information provided in 
most Data Use Policies does not  comply with basic demands regarding the 
necessary information given to subjects before consenting  that their health-related 
information will be used for research. With regards to research, Data Use Policy may 
simply read as follows: “We transfer information to vendors, service providers, and 
other partners who globally support our business, such as providing technical 
infrastructure services, analyzing how our Services are used, measuring the 
effectiveness of ads and services, providing customer service, facilitating payments, 
or conducting academic research and surveys.”41 Unlike regulation regarding 
research in human subjects or even the authorization to use PHI under HIPAA, 
regulation of other sources of Big Data research does not necessarily specify details 
                                                          
 39 Withdrawal of Subjects from Research Guidance, NIH (2010), 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/guidance/guidance-on-withdrawal-of-
subject/index.html.  
 40 Mark A. Rothstein, HIPAA Privacy Rule 2.0: Currents in Contemporary Bioethics, 41 J. 
L., MED. & ETHICS 525, 526 (2013). 
 41 Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/.  
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about what sort of information should be given to subjects of data used for research. 
They are not study specific, although information regarding the purpose of the 
research may play a role when authorizing use of information, and should be part of 
the information provided to subject authorizing the use of their information, and 
often do not succeed explaining the risks of data sharing to the public.42 It has been 
argued that privacy policies should provide subjects providing them with detailed 
information about what, why and how personal data will be collected, processed, 
stored, used and in cases, disclosed.43 Moreover, in these agreements, most social 
media companies retain the right to revise their Data Use Policies at any time 
without providing notice to the user regarding the specific change.44 In such cases 
the user may miss the opportunity to opt out or refuse to be included.45 These 
policies are difficult to understand and most people do not even read their terms.46 
Usually, they serves more as liability disclaimers than as assurances of consumer 
privacy, yet, by providing these notices, data owners comply, at least formally, with 
                                                          
 42 Certain required information, such as the sort of findings or expected implications, 
cannot always be foreseen in Big Data research, as statistical algorithms might find 
unexpected correlations and generate unexpected implications and risks. See, e.g., Joshua 
Berlinger & Maegan Vazquez, US Military Reviewing Security Practices After Fitness App 
Reveals Sensitive Info, CNN DIGITAL EXPANSION SHOOT, (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/28/politics/strava-military-bases-location/index.html (recent 
data about running routes, collected from the users of Strava, which bills itself as "the social 
network for athletes", ended up revealing location patterns of security forces working out at 
military bases in remote locations.) 
 43 Shara Monteleone, Addressing the Failure of Informed Consent in Online Data 
Protection: Learning the Lessons from Behavior-Aware Regulation, 43 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. 
& COM. 69, 79 (2015). 
 44 Michael L. Rustad & Maria Vittoria Onufrio, Reconceptualizing Consumer Terms of 
Use for a Globalized Knowledge Economy, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1085, 1086-87 (2012). 
 45 Lauren B. Solberg, Complying with Facebook's Terms of Use in Academic Research: A 
Contractual and Ethical Perspective on Data Mining and Informed Consent,  82 UMKC L. 
REV. 787, 792 (2013). 
 46 Monteleone, supra note 43, at 75. 
  101 
 BASSAN, THE ETHICS IN SYNTHETICS 
 
 
their information obligations.47 When the subject of the information used never 
learns about the research, presumed authorization can be considered a deceptive 
practice.48  
 With regards to comprehension, most users are not aware of the multiplicity 
algorithms that are gathered, stored analyzed from their data by multiple agents.49 
Many data brokers combine information about habits, behaviors, or attributes that is 
derived from Big Data sets based on individual’s online and offline accounts and 
devices, and create predictive profiles and modeling for multiple purposes, including 
commercial.50 Such profiles may be valuable to medical purposes, they also 
influence employment, insurance and may serve as grounds for discriminatory 
behaviors.51 Although these practices compromise the right to privacy of individuals 
and bear irreversible consequences related to important aspects of their lives, current 
legal framework does not address predictive models using data outside of HIPAA.  
                                                          
 47 Id. at 80. 
 48 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, THE MENLO REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES GUIDING 
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY RESEARCH, 11, (2012), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CSD-MenloPrinciplesCORE-
20120803.pdf. 
 49 Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(3); Monteleone, supra note 43, at 88. 
 50 Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(4-5); US Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, A review of the data broker industry: collection, use, and sale of 
consumer data for marketing purposes, (2013), 
http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0d2b3642-6221-4888-a631-
08f2f255b577; Satish Garla et al., What Do Your Consumer Habits Say About Your Health? 
Using Third-Party Data to Predict Individual Health Risk and Costs. SAS INSTITUTE 6, 
(2013), http://support.sas.com/resources/papers/proceedings13/170-2013.pdf. 
 51 Ann Reilly Dowd, Protect Your Privacy: A Money Investigation Reveals the Five 
Biggest Threats to Your Privacy and How You Can Safeguard Yourself Against the Most 
Serious Types of Snooping, MONEY 104, 107 (1997). (In studying the privacy practices of 
three hundred Fortune 500 companies, David Linowes, former chair of the President's 
Commission on Privatization and the U.S. Privacy Protection Commission finds that "35% of 
employers said they use personal medical information as a basis for hiring, promotion, and 
firing decisions".) Sharona Hoffman, Employing E-Health: The Impact of Electronic Health 
Records on the Workplace, (Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-1, 2010), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1531265. 
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 Moreover, private confidential data is traded all over the world. Some 
corporation’s sole purpose is to collect such data in order to capitalize on it.52 A 
company can sell de-identified individual-level data if consumers sign the research 
consent document – which 80 percent of consumers do.53 Turning profit from data 
for research purpose may play a role and influence the willingness of the subject of 
the data to agree to its use, thus such information should be provided to data 
subjects. It is not far-fetched to assume that some users would not give authorization 
to use their information for research commercial targeted advertising, purposes, even 
if they have agreed that it will be used for a health-related issue.  
 With regards to voluntariness, while the Privacy Rule generally prohibits 
covered entities from conditioning treatment, payment, enrollment, or eligibility on 
an individual's provision of an authorization,54 in social media as well as commercial 
online activities the user gives away the right for the data when using the app. Fitbit 
and Facebook are only a few examples. Most consumers are willing to pay for online 
services with personal information rather than with money.55 In these contexts, 
consumers do not have the right to control what personal information is collected, 
maintained, used, and shared by data brokers. It can be argued that the use of 
                                                          
 52 Hal Hodson, Revealed: Google AI Has Access to Huge Haul Of NHS Patient Data, NEW 
SCIENTIST. (29 Apr., 2016), https://www.newscientist.com/article/2086454-revealed-google-
ai-has-access-to-huge-haul-of-nhs-patient-data/.  
 53 Kayte Spector-Bagdady, Why You Should Worry About the Privatization of Genetic 
Data, (Sep. 8, 2016); 8.17pm AEST, https://theconversation.com/why-you-should-worry-
about-the-privatization-of-genetic-data-62591 (last visitedMarch 2, 2017).  
 54 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(b)(4) (2007). 
 55 Christine Bauer, et al., On The Value Of Information–What Facebook Users Are Willing 
To Pay, (20th European Conference on Information Systems proceedings (ECIS 2012)); 
Aleecia M. McDonald et al., Americans' Attitudes About Internet Behavioral Advertising 
Practices 63 (Proceedings of the 9th annual ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic 
society, 2010). 
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conditioned authorization does not meet the requirement of voluntary authorization 
from subjects in health-related research. 
V. POSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS FROM THE AUTHORIZATION REQUIREMENT 
 
 In some cases the HIPAA’s Privacy Rule enables the covered entities to 
obtain a complete waiver of the authorization requirement from an Institutional 
Review Board (IRB), following three criteria56: 1) The use or disclosure of PHI 
involves no more than a minimal risk to the privacy of individuals, 2) the research 
could not practicably be conducted without the waiver, or 3) without access to and 
use of the PHI.57 This is another expression of the ethical requirement to justify any 
research by demanding that the anticipated benefits and importance of the research 
will overweigh the potential harms, using the principle of proportionality. Meaning, 
exceptions to the demand for individual expression of authorization are given only 
when it is practically impossible to get individual authorization, and only when the 
risks to the research subject are minimized and balanced with the research benefits. 
Part of what the researcher will have to argue in front of the IRB is that the research 
has no harmful impact.  
 Often, researches use the method of de-identification to show that the 
research poses minimal harms on individuals whose information is being used. Data 
de-identification methods refer to the process of removing or obscuring any 
personally identifiable information from individuals’ records in order to minimize 
the risk of unintended disclosure of identity and information. Under the Privacy 
Rule, creating de-identified data or a limited data set is a health care operation of the 
                                                          
 56 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (i2ii) (2007). 
 57 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (i)(1)(i)-(ii) (2007). Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2007). 
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covered entity and, thus, does not require an individual’s authorization, even if the 
limited data set or de-identified data will function as a database for research.58 
HIPAA provides two methods for de-identification.59  
The Safe Harbor method specifies eighteen direct identifiers that when removed, 
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule’s restrictions do not apply.60 The de-identifying code can be 
assigned to the de-identified information for purposes of re-identification, but cannot 
be derived from or related to identifiers of the individual (e.g., Social Security 
number).61 Specific steps and methods used to de-identify information have been 
considered appropriate to protect the confidentiality of the individuals.62 However, 
data de-identified using the Safe Harbor method may lack critical information 
needed and become unusable for research purposes, or at least of lesser value.63 The 
technical means legally required to protect individual information lack proof or 
guarantees of privacy. There is an increasing area of work indicating that de-
                                                          
 58 Health Services Research and the HIPAA Privacy Rule, NIH, 10, (May 20, 2005), 
https://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/healthservicesprivacy.asp.  
 59 For possible mitigation methods such as suppression techniques (withholding 
information in selected records from release), generalization of the information, perturbation 
etc. See Guidance Regarding Methods for De-identification of Protected Health Information 
in Accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy 
Rule, HHS.gov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-
identification/index.html#_ednref5 (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).   
 60 Art. 164.514(e). (the identifiers are: name, address (all geographic subdivisions smaller 
than state, including street address, city county, and zip code), all elements (except years) of 
dates related to an individual (including birthdate, admission date, discharge date, date of 
death, and exact age if over 89), telephone numbers, fax number, email address, social 
security number, medical record number, health plan beneficiary number, account number, 
certificate or license number, any vehicle or other device serial number, web URL, internet 
protocol address, finger or voice print, photographic image, any other characteristic that could 
uniquely identify the individual.) 
 61 Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule , supra note ‏10, at 173. 
 62 Scott Burris et al., The Role of State Law in Protecting Human Subjects of Public 
Health Research and Practice, 31 J. L. MED. & ETHICS, 654, 656 tbl 2 (2003) (discussing U.S. 
states (48), which allow release of de-identified data to outside researchers.) 
 63 Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule , supra note ‏10, at 175. 
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identification is no-longer sufficient to protect privacy of subjects, and that data can 
be re-identified and name the data subject.64 When using data from multiple sources, 
there is a need to create links between different databases, protected and un-
protected. As the dimensions of data increase, and the number of different variables 
on each individual increases, it is more complicated to protect the identity of 
participants. Studies indicate that even after the removal of the identifiers, public 
data may contain personal identifying information that can lead to re-identification.65 
Privacy policies apply to data collected from users information through registration 
forms or cookies, and not to the content the users post.66 When this information is 
combined with de-identified data subjects can be re-identified. “The more 
information available about a person, the easier it is to re-identify the person in the 
future.”67 Once the information can be connected directly to data owners, even when 
using encryption to protect security, the Safe Harbor Method can no longer serve as 
                                                          
 64 Gregory J. Matthews & Ofer Harel, Data Confidentiality: A Review of Methods for 
Statistical Disclosure Limitation and Methods for Assessing Privacy, 5 STAT. SURVEYS, 1 
(2011); Khaled El Emam et al., A Systematic Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health 
Data, 6 PLOS ONE, p.e28071 (2011); Latanya Sweeney et al., Identifying Participants in the 
Personal Genome Project by Name (2013), 
https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1304/1304.7605.pdf; Health IT Policy Committee, Health 
Big Data Recommendations 1, 14 (HITPC Privacy and Security Workgroup, Aug. 16, 2015) 
available at 
https://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/HITPC_Draft_PSWG_Big_Data_Transmittal_2
015-08-11.pdf; Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology. 2005. Statistical Policy - 
Report on Statistical Disclosure Limitation Methodology, 10 , available at 
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/spwp22.pdf.  
 65 Beyond the HIPAA Privacy Rule , supra note ‏10, at 175. E.g., Dov Greenbaum et al., 
Genomics and Privacy: Implications of the New Reality of Closed Data for the Field,  PLoS 
Comput Biol. (2011) p.e1002278, 7; Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (not) to Protect 
Genomic Data Privacy in a Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-Identification to Evaluate 
and Design Anonymity Protection Systems,  37 J. BIOMED INFORMATICS 179 (2004); Sarah 
Zhang, Scientists Are Just as Confused about the Ethics of Big-Data Research as You, 
WIRED, (May 20, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/05/scientists-just-confused-ethics-big-
data-research/. 
 66 Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 494(5). 
 67 Id. at 494(4). 
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a magic word to waive the need for authorization to use private information, or to 
automatically consider the harms minimal.  
 Scholars approach three aspect of the harms: security of sensitive 
information,68 the consequences and ramifications involved with the violation of 
privacy,69 or the decision-making process of subject whose information could be 
used,70 but so far the challenges is greater than the success. In a complex research 
environment, regulation does not extend far enough to resolve the ethical issues 
presented by advanced research technology using data retrieved from multiple 
sources. Eighty percent of security executives in North America believe 
conventional network security solutions are insufficient to protect their companies’ 
cloud storage environments, where most of the information is located.71 It seems that 
neither researchers nor users are happy with the current practice. On the one hand, 
formal trials to adapt to the regulation does not necessarily bring an improvement in 
terms of better awareness and compliance of the users.72 It has been argued that 
researchers have reported that after the implementation of the Privacy Rule, the time 
                                                          
 68 Murdoch & Detsky, supra note 12, at 1352 (suggesting to extend security similarly to 
what is required to protect confidential financial data in other sectors). 
 69 Sharona Hoffman, Big Data and the Americans with Disabilities Act (2017). 68 
Hastings Law Journal 777 (2017); Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-33. SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841431 (suggesting to use existing regulative mechanism, such as 
the one in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, to broaden it in order to deal with new 
implications, subjecting state and local governments, employment agencies and labor unions 
to non-discriminatory practices against qualified individuals with disabilities). 
 70 Monteleone, supra note 43, at 79 (suggesting complementary measures for users' better 
decision-making as regards data protection).  
 71 James Bourne, Four in Five Execs Think Conventional Security is Not Enough for 
Cloud Environments, CLOUDTECH, (1 July 2015)., http://www.cloudcomputing-
news.net/news/2015/jul/01/four-five-execs-think-conventional-security-not-enough-cloud-
environments/ (last visited March 2, 2017). 
 72 See, Annie Anton et al. HIPAA’s Effect on Web Site Privacy Policies, 5 IEEE SEC. & 
PRIVACY 45 (2007) (A comparison of privacy policies for nine healthcare websites before and 
after HIPAA legislation found that after the legislation, the policies were more descriptive but 
longer and more difficult to comprehend). 
  107 
 BASSAN, THE ETHICS IN SYNTHETICS 
 
 
and cost per recruited participant became about 30% higher than before,73 or that is 
will cost the industry billions to come into compliance with the regulations.74 Still, 
this regulation cannot prevent privacy violations. On the other hand, critiques claim 
that individuals are given limited control and expression of autonomy over the use of 
their information due to the extended scope of authorizations, which are often 
conditioned in commercial services, open ended, and based on information that is 
insufficiently detailed or clear.  
 The second way to de-identify PHI is to have a qualified statistician 
determine, using generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods, 
that the risk is very small that the information could be used to identify the subject of 
the information.75 The notion of expert certification is not unique to the health care 
field and have been used to mitigate risk prior to sharing data. There are several 
experts (usually from computer sciences) who fill similar functions.  
In our view, expert certification is an aspect of accountability. Accountability is the 
acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility for actions, decisions, and 
policies made. Recent regulations shift the focus from the individual whose rights 
are violated toward collective responsibility and solidarity, represented by the 
principle of accountability.76 With great potential of benefit comes great 
responsibilities, therefore, the shift of focus lays even more duties on researchers to 
                                                          
 73 Roberta B. Ness & Joint Policy Committee, Influence of the HIPAA Privacy Rule on 
Health Research, 298 JAMA 2164, 2167 (2007). 
 74 Scott, supra note 18, at 513.  
 75 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b) (2013).. 
 76 Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and 
Consent 44(2014); Boyd & Crawford, supra note 5, at 672; Joanna Stjernschantz Forsberg et 
al., Changing Perspectives in Biobank Research: from Individual Rights to Concerns About 
Public Health Regarding the Return of Results, 17 EU. J. HUM. GENETICS 1544 (2009); 
Andrej Zwitter. Big Data Ethics, 1 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1,3 (2014).‏ 
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justify the importance of the research they are responsible for. While the “classical 
rights model” recognizes individual rights but assumed state enforcement for their 
violation, this flexible model is a more optimistic model, which trusts the capacity 
and willingness of private organizations to effectively police themselves emphasizes 
accountability and self-regulation in order to comply with legal, but also social 
duties they have toward others.  
 The Privacy Rule does not prescribes specific safeguards, but rather, 
requires that the covered entities will design their own policies and procedures.77 It 
requires that covered entities would implement safeguards to protect identified 
health information, and establishes the conditions under which they can use or 
disclose PHI.78 Researchers’ accountability contains private implications - on the 
individual whose information it is, and social implication on society in which such 
information is available. Accountable researchers must have responsibility over the 
use of information in a specific research, and over the ramification of their research. 
Such determination involves a person with appropriate knowledge and experience 
with generally accepted statistical, scientific principles and methods. A qualified 
expert may apply generally accepted statistical or scientific principles to compute the 
likelihood that a record in a dataset is expected to be unique, or linkable to only one 
person, within the population to which it is being compared. If an expert determines 
that the risk of identification is greater than “very small”, the expert may modify the 
information to mitigate the identification risk to that level, as required by the de-
identification standard. The expert must reduce the risk that the data sets could be 
combined with prior versions of the de-identified dataset or with other publically 
                                                          
 77  45 C.F.R. 45 § 164.530 (a)(1)(i) (2013). 
 78  45 C.F.R. § 164.530 (c)(1) (2013). 
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available datasets to identify an individual.  In general, the expert will adjust certain 
features or values in the data to ensure that unique, identifiable elements no longer, 
or are not expected to, exist. However, there is neither a specific professional degree 
or certification program for designating who is an expert at rendering health 
information de-identified particular, nor a method for assessing the level of risk and 
assure that it meets the “very small” level indicated by the method. This paper 
explores the statistical techniques of synthetic data to minimize the risks entailed in 
releasing individuals’ data for research purposes. 
VI. SYNTHETIC DATA AS A MEANS TO FULFILL ETHICAL REQUIREMENTS 
   
 The idea of synthetic (or simulated) data is introduced by Rubin.79 It is a 
method of statistical disclosure limitation based on the missing data technique of 
Multiple Imputation (MI).80 Synthetic data views sensitive data as missing values in 
the original data (hereinafter “the observed data”). In any synthetic data set, each 
data row represents a real individual. However, sensitive attributes would be fully or 
partially replaced by random draws from an appropriate posterior predictive 
distribution using MI techniques. In fully synthetic data, all the information is 
synthesized, and in partially synthetic data only some of the information is 
synthesized.  
 Ignoring the size of the data for a moment, let us consider micro-data as a 
dataset containing information about individuals. Consider a dataset in which each 
row represents a subject, and each column represents a variable. The method can 
                                                          
 79 D.B. Rubin, Statistical Disclosure Limitation, 9 J. OFFICIAL STAT.  461 (1993). 
 80 D.B. RUBIN, MULTIPLE IMPUTATION FOR NONRESPONSE IN SURVEYS (1987); Ofer Harel 
& Xiao-Hua Zhou, Multiple Imputation: Review of Theory, Implementation and Software, 
26 STAT. IN MED. 3057 (2007); D.B. Rubin, Multiple Imputation After 18+ Years, 91 J. AM. 
STAT. ASSOC. 473 (1996). 
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measure different variables (age, gender, disease status, blood pressure (BP)) or  
measure the same variable over time (BP pre-treatment, BP during treatment, BP 
after treatment, unprotected sex, needle sharing). Essentially, our complete data will 
look like a rectangle (we assume no missing data, however extensions to incomplete 
data are available). The observed micro-data (D) can be considered as a random 
sample from a specific population (P). One can use MI to create several populations 
(m > 1, e.g., m = 10) based on the observed data.81 Next, from each imputed 
population we can draw a random sample of pre-specified size (n), which results in 
m sets of complete synthetic data. 82  
 While Rubin introduced fully synthetic data sets where all data is replaced 
with imputed data and none of the released data is real, Little proposed partially 
synthetic data sets.83 In partially synthetic data the observed micro-data is still 
considered a random sample from a population (P). Each partially synthetic dataset 
consists of the non-sensitive data, which is the same across all m synthetic datasets, 
and the imputed values of the sensitive data. The use of MI here is similar to the one 
mentioned above, except that unlike fully synthetic data where all variables are 
treated as potentially sensitive, in partially synthetic data the only variables 
synthesized are those pre-specified. For example, if a dataset contains information 
about gender, race, marital status and income, only the variable income may be 
considered as sensitive, and only this variable is synthesized (m > 1) times. The m 
                                                          
 81 Id. 
 82 Trivellore E. Raghunathan et al., Multiple Imputation for Statistical Disclosure 
Limitation, 19 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 1 (2003); Rubin, supra note 79. 
 83 Roderick J.A. Little, Statistical Analysis of Masked Data, 9 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 407 
(1993). 
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sets are then combined using the combining rules specifically appropriate to partially 
synthetic datasets.84 
 In order to synthesize data, either fully or partially, researchers must rely on 
an observed dataset, using MI.85  MI was developed originally to deal with 
incomplete data. When using MI for the purpose of synthesis, we assume that either 
the whole data (for fully synthetic data), or part of the data (for partially synthetic 
data) is considered missing for the user. Conventional MI includes three steps: 
imputation, analysis and combining results. After the imputation stage, the observed 
data ceased being used and we start working in the synthetic dataset. In the 
imputation stage, a statistical model is fitted to the data, and based on that model the 
imputed data is generated as random draws from the data’s predictive distribution, 
resulting in m complete data sets. In the analysis stage, the researcher runs a pre-
specified analysis on all “complete” data and saves the estimates and variances of 
interest. Finally, simple arithmetic rules permit combining the m sets of results into 
an aggregated final solution. The combining rules will be different depending on the 
type of problem at hand.86 
 The choices of imputation models are of extreme importance and have 
implications on the biases involved.  We would like the relationships between the 
variables in the synthetic data to resemble the relationships between variables in the 
observed data so that analyses will results in similar conclusions to analyses run on 
the observed data.  For example, consider continuous data that can be represented as 
                                                          
 84 Jerom P. Reiter, Satisfying Disclosure Restrictions with Synthetic Data Sets, 18 J. 
OFFICIAL STAT. 531 (2002). 
 85 Rubin, supra note 80 (on Multiple Imputation). 
 86 Jerom P. Reiter& Trivellore E. Raghunathan, The Multiple Adaptations of Multiple 
Imputation, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N. 1462 (2007). 
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a joint normal distribution, where the correlation matrix contains the information 
about the relationships between the variables. If the correlation matrix of the 
observed data indicates high correlation between two variables, we expect the 
correlation matrix from the synthetic data to represent similar high correlation as 
well. But if the models are wrong, and the imputation model neglects to control 
some variables of interest, the correlations of these variables with others will 
diminish to zero, which means results are not accurate.  
 As we move from conventional size micro-data to Big Data, the thought 
process stays the same, but the complication due to the size of the data needs to be 
taken into consideration. When considering Big Data, it is not always clear if fully 
synthetic data is plausible to construct. The main advantage of partially synthetic 
data over fully synthetic data is the ability to deal with a larger amount of data and 
more simplified statistical models for the imputation models. Mathematically, it is 
simpler to build a model for the partially synthetic data compared with fully 
synthetic data due to the size of the models and the datasets in place. The larger the 
model is, the more parameters there are to estimate, and the complexity increases 
dramatically.  
VII. A NEW RISK-BENEFIT BALANCE 
 
 Using synthetic data enables researchers to balance potential benefits from 
data analytics for health-related research with methods of protecting the privacy of 
data subjects. The procedure of synthetic data is based on the premise that releasing 
the data will maintain the privacy of the individuals in the sample. Synthetic data can 
rely on databases from one source or several sources, with different scopes of 
privacy protections, because eventually in this approach, although the analyses on 
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these datasets will represent the population it was sampled from, all variables in the 
dataset are synthesized. Meaning, on the one hand individuals’ information is not 
being disclosed, and on the other, the scientific and social benefits are maximized. 
The confidentiality level is slightly different in each method (fully or partially 
synthesized data).87 Utility is maximized when all synthetic data is identical to the 
original data (no noise was added), as there is no actual variability between observed 
and synthetic data. These datasets are highly useful for analysts, but pose great risks 
because they may contain individuals’ sensitive information. As the variability 
between the synthetic dataset and the original dataset increases, the confidentiality 
increases and the utility decreases. When using fully synthetized data, the data 
released represents data of individual in the observed database, but effectively it is 
simulated data, not the actual data of that individual. The data analyzed is only a 
hypothesized representation of individuals, therefore the privacy of actual 
individuals is preserved. Since all the data released is synthetic, fully synthetic data 
can therefore be considered more secure. Partially synthetized data still contains 
some of the information of de-identified individuals, thus the risk in disclosure of 
information is higher in comparison to fully synthetic data that do not contain any 
individuals’ real data. However, all the sensitive information for these individuals is 
synthesized, therefore even in partially synthetic data, the ability to connect these 
data to an individual is reduced dramatically in comparison with the risks in using 
the observed data. For example, age, gender and race are not synthesized but HIV 
                                                          
 87 For different procedures to deal with privacy when analyzing micro data, see e.g., Chris 
Clifton & Tamir Tassa, On Syntactic Anonymity and Differential Privacy, In DATA 
ENGINEERING WORKSHOPS (ICDEW), 88 (2013 IEEE 29th International Conference on IEEE); 
Cynthia Dwork & Jing Lei, Differential Privacy and Robust Statistics, IN PROCEEDINGS 
OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL ACM SYMPOSIUM ON THEORY OF COMPUTING, 
371 (2009); Cynthia Dwork & Aaron Roth, The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential 
Privacy, 9 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS® IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 211 (2014). 
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status, and related biomarkers are synthesized. It does not seem like the use of 
personal information to create a synthetic data can differently satisfy the 
"impracticably to achieve individual consent” required for a waiver than any other 
use in Big Data research. The requirements of informed consent remain the same, as 
the process is done after the information has been shared. However, individuals will 
most likely be more willing to allow the use of their information for a synthesized 
database, relatively to non-synthesized one, because the risks are lower.  
 While this paper focuses on potential harms that are entangled in health-
related research in Big Data research, the equilibrium between risks and benefits 
from the research begs wide accessibility to Big Data sets that may be useful for 
future research. There is extensive motivation of the government and industrial 
officials to gather and extract maximal value from existing data for public good, and 
facilitate access to available resources that can be utilized at no risk to individuals. 
Researchers receiving federal funding often have to submit their data to a public data 
bank, such as the National Institutes of Health’s database of Genotypes and 
Phenotypes (dbGaP), which offers other researchers access to data for future work 
for little to no fee.88 Other public and private funds go into the collection and 
maintenance of databases, which become less accessible, reducing potential benefit. 
Given the value large scale information holds, Big Data, broadly defined, is 
producing increased institutional powers for those who own them. At the moment, 
large data companies create monopolies. Commercial companies do not necessarily 
have an obligation to make their data available to others, as they do not follow the 
same policy regarding their information. They have complete control over what they 
share, whom they share it with, and for what purpose. Private companies may restrict 
                                                          
 88 Spector-Bagdady, supra note 53. 
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access to their data entirely or offer small data sets only to well-resourced bodies.89 
Limited access creates a digital barrier between those who have tools and access to 
data and those who do not.90 Moreover, when those without access can neither 
reproduce nor evaluate the methodological claims of those who have privileged 
access, the validity of the research is affected. It may also affect the areas and agenda 
of future research: those privileged enough to get access to proprietary data sets will 
not risk their access being cut and chose topics that are appealing to the database 
owners. Less accessibility therefore compromises potential benefit from research 
that is not necessarily favorable to the interests of database owners and minimizes, 
rather than maximizes, the benefit in research in Big Data. Synthetic datasets may 
improve this situation. Owner of the data can choose whether to give access to data 
whether it is synthesized or not. However, they are more likely to be willing to share 
synthesized data, because the risks involved with sharing such data are lower.  
 Moreover, when using synthetic data, researchers’ access to data from 
which they can conduct a variety of secondary analyses, increases dramatically. In 
order to avoid privacy infringement, commonly the owners (data collection agencies) 
release some summary statistics of the data (such as tables of counts, means, 
variances, correlations, etc.). This is inefficient to other researchers since they cannot 
conduct most secondary analyses using only summary statistics. In particular, if only 
summary statistics are reported, results such as regression coefficients, odds ratios 
                                                          
 89 Boyd & Crawford, supra note 5. See, e.g., Glenn & Monteith, supra note 9 at 498, 
Spector-Bagdady, supra note 53; James Rogers, Hacker Looks To Sell 655,000 Alleged 
Patient Healthcare Records On The Dark Web, FOXNEWS.COM, (June 27, 2016), 
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2016/06/27/hacker-looks-to-sell-655000-alleged-patient-
healthcare-records-on-dark-web.html (23andMe recently announced that the drug company 
Genetech offered to pay up to $60 million to use its database to conduct Parkinson’s research. 
Prices range from about $96,000 to $490,000 for each database.) 
 90 Boyd & Crawford, supra note 5, at 673. 
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and other frequently used parameters are not possible to obtain and may minimize 
potential benefits from existing databases, rather than maximizing them. The main 
advantage in synthetic data is allowing the use of extensive information, unrelated to 
actual individuals, across a wide range of research settings and substantive areas. 
Each synthetic dataset can be analyzed based on the common complete data 
statistical analysis procedure (i.e. regression) required by the secondary researchers. 
For example, secondary researchers who obtain the m sets of synthetic data might 
wish to analyze the role of some of the variables in a new regression. The results 
from each dataset are saved and combined for a final result taking into account the 
fact that the data were synthesized.91 If the methodology used for imputation is 
general enough, (almost) any statistical procedure will be applicable for secondary 
users and there are no limitations to the specific secondary statistical analysis 
researchers can use. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
  Health-related research in Big Data holds not only a promise, but 
also a peril as a result of privacy violations, particularly when data is used from 
multiple resources. Neither regulatory nor security solutions adequately administrate 
risks involved in health-related research that relies on traditional health-related data 
as well as non-traditional sources, in particular when research combines health 
related and public data voluntarily provided by users. 
 This paper explores the statistical techniques of synthetic data to minimize 
the risks entailed in releasing individuals’ data for research purposes. The method of 
synthetic data is not an exclusive method to conduct research, but demonstrates the 
                                                          
 91 For combining rules see, Raghunathan, Reiter &Rubin, supra note 80. For fully 
synthetic data see, Rubin, supra note 79. 
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importance in using multi-disciplinary scientific methods in the design and analysis 
of health-related research in Big Data. Statistical models and methodologies of 
analysis still leave many open questions and may require adaptation according to the 
social, medical, financial context of each source, similar to the diverse 
methodological and analytical approaches used in social science. If not adapted, we 
risk misunderstanding the results and as a result misallocate important public 
resources. This is true for any statistical analyses regardless to the database in 
question. While this model is imperfect, when dealing with multiple sources in 
health-related research, it addresses many of the challenges posed by the Safe Harbor 
method of de-identification in a better way, increasing privacy and accessibility to 
usable useful data.  
 The multi-disciplinary method may serve as a basis for coherent regulation, 
complying with the principle of researcher’s accountability infused with technology. 
Where known harms can be minimized and benefits increased, it may be 
unjustifiable to conduct research without using such methods. We join the call to 
develop social media policies pursuant to the HIPAA Privacy Rule,92 as well as an 
ethical Big Data policy, which will encompass information rules that manage the 
appropriate flows of information in ethical ways.93 
 
                                                          
 92 Kimbra Ratliff, HIPAA Violations on Social Media: Will HHS Continue to Ignore, 45 
U. MEM. L. REV. 633, 638 (2014). 
 93 Richards, Neil M and King, Jonathan H, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 
395 (2014).‏ 
